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A Final Flowering of the Developmental State: The IT Policy
Experiment of the Korean Information Infrastructure, 1995–2005
Abstract
In contrast to the private-led initiative typified by the US Information Superhighway project
in the early 90s, the Korean government was in the forefront of directing the Korean
Information Infrastructure (KII) project (1995–2005), which was aimed at building a
nationwide broadband backbone network. This study first looks at how the developmental
mechanism of Korea during the KII project signifies the weaker status of the civilian
government of the 90s. This study then shows how in the KII project, the government served
primarily as a moderator mediating conflicts between the private sector and the relevant
public agencies. To describe the close state-capital linkages in the KII project, this study
focuses on the government’s financial investment system for enticing the private sector to
install the IT infrastructure, the neatly coordinated policy networks between the public and
private entities, and the policy discourses by which the government achieved a national
consensus on IT-driven economic development.

KEYWORDS: Korean Information Infrastructure, broadband network, Chaebol, telecom
company, developmental state
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1. Introduction
Since the late 80s, the Korean government had to rapidly transform its developmental
mechanisms in response to external pressures such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreements and the US–Korea bilateral trade negotiations and internal ones such as the mass
protest against the authoritarian state since 1987, the growth in power of the elite Chaebols,
— the Korean form of crony capitalismi — and the decline of the foreign market due to the
Korea’s export-oriented manufacturing industry. Driven by the global-local dynamics, the
“strong state” model in Korea has gradually withered and been replaced by the “flexible
state” or “market-driven state.”
The Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) project was designed during this decline
in the power of the state. Imitating the US National Information Initiative (NII), the KII’s
main goal was to interconnect the public agencies through a high-speed broadband network,
and eventually to promote IT productivity in the private sector and to create a larger job
market through this network. In contrast to American NII initiative, which was led by the
private sector, in Korea the government took the leading role in guiding the KII from start to
finish. Through the KII project, the three major stakeholders — the state, the national telecom
duopoly (KT and Dacom), and the Chaebols — have become deeply interpenetrated, by
means of state financial support, organizational collaboration, and a hegemonic consensus
manufactured by the government’s IT-related rhetoric. The KII project represents a mixture
of the old and the new developmental state model, which is characterized more by the
collaborative ties between the state and the private sector rather than by the state’s dominance
over the private sector. Inheriting the legacy of the old developmental state,ii the KII project
was a final example of the state’s ability to launch, guide, and complete a major national IT
policy initiative.
This paper is a policy analysis of the KII project as an example of an evolving phase
of the developmental state model. This policy analysis aims to detail the deep structure of the
relationships between the state and large capital directly involved in implementing the KII
project, investigating how they enter into alliances with each other and how they articulate
their own interests as they relate to implementing the project.
Within political elites in Korea, the KII project is seen as a very recent successful
story of state interventionism since the Korean economic crisis of 1997. Many scholars view
the IT project in Korea as the “second” phase of the Asian economic miracle: the first phase
involved Asia catching up to the West in the industrial economy, while the second phase
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involves Asia becoming the leader in IT fields. The objective of the paper is to challenge the
optimistic view of the ostensibly successful IT project in Korea, and instead to focus on the
hidden mechanisms for implementing the KII project. In so doing, this paper seeks to observe
the state–business linkages and the sacrifice of other stakeholders in order to create or
maintain those links.

2. Research method
Confronting East Asia’s economic “miracle” during 1970s and 1980s, a group of
social scientists in the West turned away from neoclassical or market-centered view and
dependency theories and developed alternative interpretations for the new phenomenon. The
academic field known as “developmental state theories” rapidly grew to explain how the
interventionist role of the state in the four “Asian Tigers” — Hong Kong, Singapore, South
Korea, and Taiwan — allowed these countries to successfully catch up with the
industrialization of the West. Although the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, which
represented a harbinger of global instability, diminished scholarly interest in “developmental
state theories,” it is obvious that, even after this economic turmoil, a rigid tendency toward
state interventionism in the economy has survived in East Asian states, and the interventionist
state has partly succeeded in promoting the national information economy — while
simultaneously creating massive new labor market insecurities, the intensification of
inequality, and exploitation (Burkett & Hart-Landsberg, 1998; Pirie, 2006). At the theoretical
level, this paper rereads the old developmental arguments anew, and rethinks those arguments
in the light of the state-led KII project in Korea.
The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyze the contextual factors that
conditioned the Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) project implemented by the Korean
government from 1995 to 2005. The primary research question of this paper is to observe
what kinds of symbiotic relationships between governmental and business entities have
developed through the KII project. Concretely, this paper examines how the state has
constructed a new relationship with the Chaebols through the KII project, far from the
authoritarian and interventionist state in the past military regimes directing over the
Chaebols. In other words, the paper shows how the state, the rapidly growing telecom
duopolies, and the Chaebols in Korea have become deeply interpenetrated, by means of state
financial support, the organizational collaboration between these entities, and a hegemonic
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consensus. This paper limits the observed scope of the linkages to the government-led
investment in the private sector and the organizational network of collaboration.
To investigate the symbiotic relationship between the state and the private sector in
the KII project, this paper has the following structure: it first explores the scholarly literature
based on the developmental state theories that has described the patterns of such collaborative
ties. The analysis then focuses on the prior-investment system led by the government, the
policy consultation bodies created for the project between the state and the telecom
incumbents, and the government’s IT policy rhetoric for creating a hegemonic consensus.
This paper concludes that the denser the network of state–business alliances or linkages
becomes the more citizens are excluded from the decision-making processes.
This paper uses data from in-depth interviews with government officials from the
Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC), the National Computerization Agency
(NCA — now the National Information Society Agency), and the telecom companies KT and
Dacom, as well as official documents relating to the project published by the MIC and the
NCA that contain organizational charts and describe the major stakeholders’ relationships
and the changes in their policy network based on the shifts in specific policy goals.
3. The Transformative Phases of the Developmental State in Korea
In modern Korea, the concept of the developmental state arose under the first military regime
(1963–79), that of Cheong-hee Park, who came to power by coup d’état. Park achieved rapid
economic growth by upgrading the import-substitution economiesiii of the Syngman Rhee
(1948–60) and Po Sun Yun (1960–62) administrations, which were largely dependent on US
aid, to export-oriented economies through the state-bank-Chaebol nexus. Park’s regime is
commonly described as kaebal-dokjae, which means “economic growth through
dictatorship.” During the Park regime, government–business relationships were formed under
the “overall guidance of a pilot planning agency” (Johnson, 1987: 145), such as the
Economic Planning Board (EPB), which set forth a socialist-style national plan for
industrialization. There were, in fact, five successive five-year macro-economic plans
between 1963 and 1986. The Park administration thus became an archetype of the
developmental state which successfully accomplished industrial modernization in the shortest
time. The Park regime was based on a strong repressive state, the state’s dominance over the
private sector, and growth-oriented interventionism involving labor exploitation and
suppression.iv
Even after Park’s assassination in 1979 by his intelligence chief, the military-backed
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interventionism in the market by the administration of General Doo-hwan Chun (1980–88),
who once again came to power in a military coup, was extensive until the 1987 prodemocracy movement forced him to introduce a direct presidential voting system. After
taking power, Chun appointed technocrats who had earned doctoral degrees in Economics in
the US and were known as followers of the neoliberal Milton Friedman (Kim, 1999). This
hardly means, however, that the Chun administration whole-heartedly embraced laissez-faire
economics. Greatly influenced by the global trend of neoconservatism promoted from the
early 1980s onwards by Reagan in the US (Reaganism) and Thatcher in Britain
(Thatcherism), Chun intervened strongly and directly in the market under neoconservatism.
Chun always saw Cheong-hee Park as his role model, and his regime was the
embodiment of the strong, repressive state. For instance, in 1980, to silence voices critical to
his regime, Chun enacted the Basic Press Law and forcefully conducted the eonrontongpaehap, the “compulsory reform of the media.” Chun commanded KBS, the state-owned
broadcaster, to absorb the TBC television network, which was owned by Samsung Corp. He
also ordered the pro-government newspaper, Kyonghyang Shinmun, to absorb Shin-A Ilbo, a
daily newspaper, and forced at least six local newspapers to close their business permanently.
Over 700 journalists were dismissed from their jobs and the remaining newspapers were
subjected to a high degree of government control (Billet, 1990). As another example of his
use of state power against the Chaebols, in 1985 Chun dismantled the seventh largest
conglomerate in the nation, the Kookjae group, which had around 200 subsidiaries at that
time, merely because it refused to donate “political funds” (protection money, in essence).
This example shows that regime had the power to punish the Chaebols for the slightest
disobedience, and also illustrates the rent-seeking relations between the ruling junta and the
business elites.
Since the changing political climate brought about by the democratization movement
of 1987, the public began to critique the symbiosis between the government and the
Chaebols. The domestic capital itself began to demand a market economy free from the
government’s direct intervention. Due to the rapid growth of the Chaebols and the rising
political pressure from below, the government could not wield absolute power over the
private sector any more. During the presidency of Tae-Woo Noh (1988–93), Chun’s
designated successor, the technocrats chose a via media in which the Chaebols were
supported by being granted lucrative business licenses, special loans and other financial
benefits from government agencies, and contracts to build the national infrastructure to
promote market efficiencies. For instance, in 1992 the Noh administration licensed
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Sunkyong, the seventh largest Chaebol in the nation, as the cellular phone provider over the
other more competitive bidders because the son of Sunkyong’s owner was married to
President Noh’s daughter. Although the license was ultimately withdrawn due to the public’s
growing antipathy, the case was a typical example of Korea’s crony capitalism.
Under the administration of Young-Sam Kim (1993–1998), the first democratically
elected president, the government endorsed the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), an
organization largely representing the Chaebols’ interests, to select the assignees for the
telecom licenses during the telecom reform of 1993. In 1995 the government allowed the
Chaebols to enter the media industry by granting them profitable new licenses for cable
television services (Shim, 2002). The Chaebols became the largest recipients of the lucrative
profits stemming from the state’s permission to launch new business in the telecom and
media sector. During this time, the domestic Chaebols have also expanded their scope into
the global market through building subsidiaries and investing the capital. Further, the
Chaebols also borrowed low-interest foreign loans — as of 1996, the average debt ratio of
the 30 top conglomerates reached 450% — without screening by the government. The
Chaebols’ dependence on foreign financial capital accelerated the 1997 economic crisis due
to volatile foreign hedge funds, speculative capital, and international lending. Under the
pressure of the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications and the IMF bailout program
— in which Korea obtained $US58 billion of emergency loans — the Dae-Jung Kim
administration (1998–2003) privatized KT, the state-owned telecom incumbent, and fully
opened the domestic banking, media, and telecom market, among others, to foreign
investors.v The government’s dominance over the Chaebols has gradually waned, while the
larger Chaebols have accumulated even more power as the medium-sized ones have declined
or been absorbed.vi President Moo-hyun Roh (2003–08) confessed the state was losing its
power to regulate the Chaebols when he commented, “We have already entered into the age
of big capital having the upper hand over the state.” The Samsung bribery scandal provides
an illustration of how widespread the Chaebols power may be: in January of 2008, at the
insistence of civil rights groups, the Roh administration launched an investigation of
Samsung centered on whether it had amassed slush funds, peddled influence by routinely
bribing government officials, the media, and members of the judiciary, and engaged in shady
stock deals to pass control of the group from its chairman, Kun-hee Lee, to his only son.
Courageous whistle-blower Yong-cheol Kim, the former head of Samsung’s legal affairs
team, joined by members of the Catholic Priests Association for Justice, told a radio station
that “the list of bribe-takers includes not just top prosecutors and ministers in the Roh
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administration, but also people recently nominated or mentioned as possible members of the
cabinet or high-ranking staff members of the Blue House [the Korean White House]” (Korea
Times, 10 January 2008). The public, therefore, is skeptical that the “Republic of Samsung”
can truly be brought to justice considering the extent of Samsung’s power in Korean
society.vii This scandal reveals that the parasitic bond between corrupt state bureaucrats and
monopoly capitalists is still very much alive even under a politically progressive
administration and that the balance of power has rapidly shifted towards the latter since 1997
financial crisis.
In sum, Korea’s democratic turmoil in 1987 began the momentum to weaken the
absolute power the state had enjoyed since 1963, while the 1997 financial crisis under the
civilian government remarkably enhanced the Chaebols’ power, through their alliance with
foreign capital; once dominated by the state, it is the Chaebols that now dominate it. In
responding to shifting external and internal factors, the evolving relationship between the
state and the conglomerates has transformed the developmental state model from that of the
strong and repressive state through that of a limited or flexible state to that of the marketdriven state.
4. The KII Project as a Legacy of The Developmental State Model
The close relationship between the state and economic conglomerates in Korea has often
been termed jeongkyong yuchak (“the symbiosis of two entities”), which has a negative
connotation.viii In this symbiosis, the government granted moneymaking licenses to, and
invested public funds in, the largest conglomerates, and in return the Chaebols donated large
sums to political slush funds. A unique mechanism of the developmental state is to transcend
simple rent-seeking links between the two dominant elites and to transform their symbiosis
into a mechanism for economic growth. Although developmentalism, promoted under the
slogan of national modernization, conceals such chronic problems as an unethical business
culture, power elitism, cronyism, corruption, corporate suppression of labor, deep class
divisions, and the public’s exclusion from the decision-making process, nevertheless, the
unethical mechanisms of jeongkyong yuchak have been a driving force for economic growth,
curbing the excessive penetration of foreign capital and enhancing the market
competitiveness of domestic conglomerates.
Many scholars have explored the transformations of state–business relationships in
Korea, focusing on cross-regime variations in economic development, specifically, the
shifting the balance of power between the two. Analyses of Korean state–business relations
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include a shift “from dominance to symbiosis” (Kim, 1988); “governed interdependence”
(Weiss, 1988); a “pragmatic mix of government guidance with private initiative” (Jeon,
1994); the “patron-client relation” (Nam, 1994); a shift from “the stern but stable statedirected symbiotic partnership to a more unruly and erratic partnership” (Moon, 1994);
“embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995); “public-private reciprocity” (Fields, 1997); the shift
from the developmental state to the “post-developmental” or “market-driven state” (Kim,
1999; 2005); “path dependency” (Jang, 2000); an “eclecticism beyond orthodoxies” (Clark,
2002; Clark & Jung, 2004); a “state–Chaebol alliance based on a more populist social
contract” (Hundt, 2005); a “transformative state in which the state acted as senior partner
rather than commander-in-chief” (Cherry, 2005); and the demise of “Korea, Inc.” (the state–
banks–Chaebols complex) and the rise of “neoliberal consensus” (the coalition of Chaebols,
technocrats, politicians, economic experts, and NGOs) (Lim & Jang, 2006; Lee & Han,
2006).
Despite their slightly different foci and analyses, most studies note the major
contextual factors weakening the state’s power, such as the growing Chaebol-dominated
economy, increasing democratization, and global pressures for liberalization. They also agree
that the Korean state’s modus operandi has changed considerably from the military regimes
to the civilian governments. Some of the studies further subdivide their analyses by into
periods marked by such historical events as the citizen’s uprising of 1987 and the IMF
financial crisis of 1997. Some scholars describe the shifts in the state–Chaebol relationship as
if the older relationship has been completely annulled by the new. The present analysis, in
contrast, sees the state-business linkages as transformative and continuously evolving, while
retaining embedded traces of the past. As shown in Figure 1, the KII project, which extended
from 1995 to 2005, was accomplished during Korea’s evolution from a limited or flexible
development state to a market-driven or post-development state. These phases of evolution
are quite distant from the strong state model exemplified by the first two military regimes
(those of Park and Chun). Initiated during the flexible state phase, the KII project involved
coordinative state–business relationships which were maintained through continuous
negotiation processes carried out by a series of intermediary committees. Nevertheless, the
entire project was initiated, developed, and guided by the state — a situation which would be
difficult, if not impossible, to replicate in Korea’s present post-developmental state phase of
evolution.
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Figure 1. The evolving phases of the developmental state and the KII project

Source: compiled by the author

5. The Close State–Business Linkages Throughout the KII Project
The major goal of Young-Sam Kim’s administration was to shift Korea away from its exportcentered economy, which had been the major mechanism of market productivity under the
military regimes, and search out a new source of profits for the domestic conglomerates. Kim
favored the affiliation of Korea into the global economy and regarded the KII as a powerful
engine to drive the nation’s economic structure towards the knowledge-based economy. By
interconnecting government agencies and public institutions with high-speed broadband
networks, he sought to upgrade the nation’s infrastructure and expand its capacities to create
a new IT-driven market. In 1994, the Kim administration announced the broad master plan
for the KII and launched the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC), which
absorbed the major IT-related administrative functions from other ministries. In 1995, the
government also issued the “Framework Act on Informatization Promotion” (FAIP, Act No.
4969) which included the legal provisions for conducting the KII policy plan which set forth
the R&D goals to be met, provided the funding for the long-term IT project, and established
the top decision-making committee and its subsidiary bodies.
The KII project has been highly praised as a successful policy experiment by
government officials, policymakers, scholars, and journalists from foreign countries, who
focus on Korea’s attainment of “broadband heaven” through vigorous state leadership and
corporate cooperation. Few, however, have examined the inner mechanisms of the KII
project’s success such as the state-led funding structure, the special steering and intermediate
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committees, and the consensual dynamics of IT discourse. This section investigates the
mechanisms that made the eleven-year state-led project viable, and examines how the statebusiness linkages have became more flexible and less consistent since the demise of the
strong, repressive state.
5.1. Taming the Telecom Incumbents with the Carrot, Not the Stick
Information infrastructure projects such as the KII are typically burdensome to the private
sector, and corporations are therefore usually less than enthusiastic about such plans, which
involve massive, long-term investment, high risk, and uncertain returns (for this reason, the
Clinton–Gore NII initiative failed to attract the necessary private sector involvement). To
involve Korean Telecom (KT) and Dacom in the KII project, the Kim administration offered
a variety of enticements: preferential tax treatment, the granting of new licenses, and
investment loans underwritten by the government. KT, the domestic telecom incumbent, was
relatively favorable to the government, which was its dominant stockholder until KT was
completely privatized in 2002 (Kim, 5 June 2007). The government had also allowed Dacom
to acquire licenses for international and long-distance telephony services during the national
telecom restructurings of 1990 and 1994, respectively, which were initiated for the purpose of
curbing the international pressure for telecom market liberalization, and Dacom had rapidly
emerged as the second largest telecom company in Korea. As a result, the government was
able to gain the cooperation of the two telecom incumbents without any great conflict. A
deputy director of LG Dacom described the situation this way:

The KII project was very supportive for the private partners in that the government
minimized our business risk by its public investment. At that time nobody dared to
invest the enormous funds for it; through the public funding, Dacom was able to
leapfrog ahead by facilitating the nationwide optical networks. The contribution from
public investment was highly significant. (Song, 29 May 2007)
A manager of KT’s Network Investment Planning Department also agreed on the effect of
the state-sponsored investment:
It is obvious that the state-led “investment first, construction next” policy plan gave
KT and Dacom the incentive to participate in the KII project without a great business
risk, and also minimized the potential friction between the government and us
throughout the project. In those days, KT, as the first partner in the government
project, benefited from the immense state-led investment that allowed us to expand
the optical networks. (Kim, 1 June 2007)
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The “investment first, construction next” principle was the telecom companies’ major
incentive to join in the KII project, allowing them to minimize their investment risk and cost
at the earlier stage of the project. KT and Dacom also regarded the huge project as a chance
to upgrade their copper lines to high-speed fiber optic networks.
In the building of the backbone networks connecting the public agencies and
institutions — the so-called KII-G — KT was allotted a 70% share and Dacom a 30% share.
The KII-public (KII-P) was independently built as a commercial network through the budget
of the telecom companies themselves, and the KII-testbed (KII-T), the optimal high speed
R&D network, was built by the public-private partnership. For the KII-G, its most important
backbone network, the government invested a total of $US6.2 billion over the three phases.
At the beginning, the government as the major stakeholder aimed to own the backbone
network directly and grant the telecom companies a 25-year lease to it. The government —
specifically, the MIC as funding distributor and the National Computerization Agency (NCA,
now the National Information Society Agency) as funding manager and coordinator — also
pressured the telecom operators to apply an 80% or 90% discount to the proposed online
service charges for public agencies that would become subscribers in September of 1997. As
Che-Hyun Jo, the Deputy Director of Dacom and one of the key actors in the KII-G project,
noted in his official interview with the NCA (2005), the discount rate requested by the
government was burdensome, and the mood became very dark within the telecom companies.
The sensitive issues of the KII-G network ownership and service charges triggered critical
conflicts between the government and the private sector. In addition, the Board of Audit and
Inspection (BAI)’s questioning of the MIC’s funding method for installing the optical lines in
1996 jeopardized the completion of the project itself (NCA, 2005, p. 130–131).
This crisis at the early stages of the project (1995–1997) finally caused the MIC to
change the subscriber costs and ownership structure: It decided to transfer ownership of the
fiber-optic backbone lines to KT and Dacom and to establish a joint public-private sector KII
fund (a so-called “bilateral netting account”) out of which the KII-G would be built and out
of which the government would subsidize 40% of the subscriber service charge. In return, the
two telecom companies agreed to reimburse the joint fund a portion of their profits year by
year until their government loans were paid off, and to offer a 40% discount rate to KII-G
subscribers. As an interviewee who was an official at the NCA, which managed the cost
system between two entities, commented, the new cost mechanisms for the KII-G enabled by
the government subsidies led to a breakthrough in the conflicts between the government and
the private sector (Rha, 28 May 2007). Further, since a 40% discount and a 40% government
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subsidy was applied to the service charges, government agencies and public institutions were
able to receive broadband Internet for 20% of the actual cost, and institutional users grew
rapidly — from 2,184 subscriber lines in 1996 to 30,137 lines in 1998 (Lee et al., 2007).
Once a critical mass of subscribers had been reached, the government was able to complete
the KII-G phase of the project without further difficulty.
The increase in subscribers from public institutions and agencies brought a more
stable flow of profits to the telecom companies, and this, in turn, furthered the development
of the KII-P, the commercial network. At this point, the government could not overtly
intervene in guiding the KII-P because of external pressuresix brought to bear on the
government. As an official of the NCA (now the NIA) describes it,
In the mid-90s, the government had no choice but to leave the KII-P’s development in
the hands of the private sector. Under strong global pressure to liberalize the telecom
market, the government could not intervene in the market or lead the KII-P directly,
but could only recommend the government’s roadmap to the private sector.
Otherwise, it might cause serious friction in US–Korea trade relations. (Jeong, 5 June
2007)
Despite this, since 1997 the government has successfully stimulated private investment in the
local loop and facility-based competition by introducing the so-called “cyber-building
certificate program” into the KII-P. Through this certificate program, apartments and
buildings were ranked according to their capacity to handle high-speed Internet.x As a public
official who worked for the KII project pointed out, because South Korea’s population is
largely located in a few large urban areas and because most residents live in large apartment
buildings, the MIC’s facility-based Internet promotion policy was effective in expanding the
penetration of high-speed Internet service into the general public. He added that, in the early
stages of this program, the certificate system also allowed construction companies to raise the
mortgage price on new government-certified “Internet-ready” apartments (Moon, 7 June
2007). The demand created through the indirect promotion of broadband Internet assured the
telecom companies and the construction companies — the latter of which were mostly owned
by the Chaebols — a steady stream of new customers. Further, since 2001 the Ministry of
Construction and Transportation (MCT) has required that all new apartments or multidwelling units have broadband Internet connections (Falch, 2007; Lee & Chan-Olmsted,
2004).
In sum, the domestic telecom companies were fully supported by the state both
through the immense financial underwriting of the KII-G and the assurance of fixed
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subscribers and then the MCT’s promotion of the KII-P through the certificate system
together. Rather than the state dominating the private sector by top-town command, as in an
earlier period, disagreements between the two were settled by a series of bilateral
negotiations between the state and the telecom companies. As a principal researcher at the
NIA notes, “These close public-private relationships reflect the specific political system of
Korea” (Jeong, June 5 2007). The KII project, thus, is a prime example of the limited or
flexible state model — of the shift in state–capital relations “from dominance to symbiosis”
(Kim, 1988).
5.2. Intermediary Organizations for the KII Project
In the early 90s, before the launch of the KII project, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) —
which then regulated the national budget office — was hesitant to allocate the immense
public funds necessary for the project because its cost–benefit justification was weak.
Further, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) argued that most equipment
for the networks fell under its jurisdiction and thus that the MOTIE was responsible for the
KII project, whereas the MIC’s focus was on the regulatory aspects of the network-based
telecom market (Jeong & King, 1997). The KII project, however, was seen as the engine in a
plan for national economic growth, and neither bureaucratic gridlock nor budgetary concerns
could long be sustained in the face of such a vision.
Just after the Basic Plan for the KII project was announced in 1993, the government
organized the KII Taskforce to draw up a more concrete roadmap for the project. The
Taskforce was made up of officials from the MIC and the NCA, from the telecom provider
KT, and from the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), which is
the government-sponsored R&D institute. Based on the Taskforce’s preliminary investigation
into the viability of the KII project, in May 1994 the government created the KII Steering
Committee (Presidential Order No.14275), which was composed of the Prime Minister, as the
chair, and twelve relevant cabinet ministers. Under the KII Steering Committee, the
government appointed the KII Working Committee, chaired by the Vice-Minister of the
Korea Development Institute (KDI, a semi-governmental think tank), and high-ranking
officials of the relevant government agencies. Under this KII Working Committee, the
government organized the KII Planning Board to carry out such concrete tasks as designing
the master plan, gathering the public funds, and developing the technologies to be employed
in the backbone network.
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Figure 2. Organizational Chart of the KII Planning Board

Source: author and mostly MIC & NCA (2005, p. 61)

As shown in Figure 2, the IT Policy Chief at the MoC (now MIC) is the head of the
Planning Board, which made up of six divisions, each related to some aspect of the project’s
scope: the KII Coordination & Planning Division, the KII-G Planning Division, the KII-P
Planning Division, the KII R&D Division, the KII Management Division, and the KII Market
Support Division. The members of these six divisions were selected from the following: the
public officials of the MIC, the MOTIE, the KDI, and the Ministry of Finance and Economy;
experts and researchers from the ETRI and the NCA; and officials from the telecom
companies of KT, Dacom, and Korean Mobile Telecom (now SK Telecom). With the help of
the KII Advisory Committee, set up for the purpose of policy advice, the Planning Board
directed the KII project from its inception until 1995, when its affairs were transferred to the
Informatization and Planning Office at the MIC (NCA, 2006; MIC & NCA, 2005). From
early in the national IT project, therefore, the government ensured the interconnection of the
private sector and the relevant public agencies through this Planning Board.
The KII was developed in three phases, based on the shifting of specific policy goals.
During the first phase of building a backbone network (1995–1997) and the second phase of
backbone network completion (1998–2000), the KII-G Steering Council and the KII-G
Service Council — which succeeded the KII Planning Board in 1995 — were assigned to
monitor the ongoing probable issues and discuss the service cost, quality, and upgrade, with
the private sector representatives. These Councils mediated a series of conflicts between the
state and the private sector in the earlier phase of the project. In contrast to the KII-P, which

State–Business Symbiosis in Korea’s IT Project	
  

15

was mostly left to the self-ruling mechanisms of market, the government steadily steered the
KII-G project to completion by means of these intermediary organizations. By the beginning
of the second phase of the KII project, President Dae-Jung Kim was politically overburdened
with managing the IMF financial crisis and the WTO agreements, both of which occurred in
1997. The government considered requesting the National Assembly to reduce the budget
allotted to the KII project but decided to maintain the pre-assigned quotas of the KII
infrastructure investment. On the threshold of the third and final phase of the KII project
(2001–2005), the Kim administration began to focus on the backbone network as a
significant catalyst for market development.
To comply with Kim’s ambitious vision, in 2001 the government organized the
Committee for the KII Advancement, which included the major private actors and public
institutions involved in building the three backbone networks — the KII-G, the KII-P, and
the KII-T. Figure 3 shows the organizational chart of the Committee for the KII
Advancement. The Office of the KII Advancement — a new entity created by the NCA —
coordinated the whole organization by mediating between the four Subcommittees: the KII-T
Advancement Subcommittee, the KII-G Advancement Subcommittee, the KII-P
Advancement Subcommittee, and the R&D Subcommittee.
Figure 3 Organizational chart of the Committee for the KII Advancement

Source: NCA (2003, January)

Each Subcommittee was composed of high-ranking officials from the government agencies,
the mobile and landline telecom service providers, the government-sponsored R&D research
centers, the IT policy research institutes, the major Chaebols as the telecom equipment
manufacturers, the IT-related business associations, and the universities (NCA, January
2003). By embracing new entrants into the project such as the mobile telecom service
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providers, the commercial Internet service providers, and the Chaebols as telecom equipment
manufacturers in addition to the established participants, the government desired to maximize
the economic effects of the KII project.
The main issues discussed by the Committee were promoting the domestic telecom
equipment market, nurturing the software and media contents market, and creating
commercial values from the KII (NCA, 2003, p. 10–11). The Committee for the KII
Advancement promoted upgrading the national information infrastructure in order to
reposition it for the new economy. The telecom equipment market, however, was getting
worse, because, after 2001, the national telecom vendors ceased to produce and install the
domestically-made asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switch, which was a critical
component of the high-speed information network, due to its outmodedness by the IP-based
router, and replaced many of the ATM switches with foreign IP-based router equipment. The
ATM was a core technology, developed by a coalition of the state, the R&D institute (ETRI),
and the Chaebols, by which the government had created a new domestic demand for telecom
manufacture and thus had shielded the national telecom market from the dominant market
power of the multinational telecom companies. Due to the change of the technological
paradigm created by the emergence of the Internet, however, the government was forced to
shift its R&D support from a growth policy centered on the old ATM switch to one centered
on the new IP-based router. They had waited too late, however, and the state–private sector
attempt to develop a core IP network technology and redirect the technology’s developmental
path failed.
According to a principal researcher of the NCA (Jeong, 5 June 2007), the government
spent KR 4–5 billion won (approximately $US500 million) for operating the intermediary
organizations described above. This expenditure signifies the government’s bid to enhance
the bureaucratic efficiencies. In fact, the IT-related inter-ministerial structures such as the KII
Planning Board were a legacy of old National Basic Information System (NBIS), a national
computerization project launched under the Chun administration. Chun first conceived of
information and technology as a new engine of economic growth, as well as a bureaucratic
tool to rationalize the organizational structures of the public sector through the use of a
backbone network. Just as the civilian government established the KII Steering Committee in
1994, the military regime organized the NBIS Steering Committee, an inter-ministerial
agency, in 1989, to resolve potentially problematic issues affecting several different
government departments. Since the period of the military regimes, then, intermediary
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organizations have served as the policy mechanisms to minimize internal conflict and
enhance the speed of decision-making processes through efficient consensual mechanisms.
The series of intermediary organizations for the KII project reflects the Korean
government’s inability to enact the national infrastructure plans through a top-down
command structure over the private sector, and its anxious desire to attract them into the
policy planning process. The intermediary organizations were quite efficient at least in
lessening the friction with the private sector, while at the same time they intentionally
excluded the voices of civil society from the decision-making process. Figure 2 and 3 show
graphically the lack of any conduit to transmit the citizens’ concerns into the special
committees. From the start of the KII project, the government simply considered the supply
side for enhancing the broadband networks through a strategic partnership with the private
sector, ignoring the possibility of the citizens’ participation. The government could defend
itself by arguing that it through the KII project served the public interest by enabling more
high-speed Internet access and at lower prices. The national IT policy initiative, however,
manifested such undemocratic characteristics as uncritical technocratic IT promotion,
preferential treatment for a few private sector incumbents, and profit-driven strategy plans.
The logic of exclusion relying on the top-down policy-making process enabled the
government to exhibit its cause rather than to hear the real voices of the citizens.
5.3. The Exhibitionist IT Policy Initiatives and Discourses
The government’s nationwide IT policy was greatly mobilized by the technocrats’
“exhibitionist” policy discourses aimed at accomplishing the goal of “internationalization,” a
term that dominated the rhetoric of the Young-sam Kim administration (1993–98). The KII
project would not have been possible without the active propagation of IT policy plans, and
each successive administration has proliferated a series of IT policy initiatives and their
accompanying rhetoric. To evoke the national goal of building a backbone network, in 1996
the Kim administration announced the Basic Plan on Informatization Promotion (BPIP), the
first IT policy initiative at the national level. The first goal of this initiative was to popularize
the slogan of IT-based development throughout Korea, among government officials at the
national and the provincial level, as well as in the private sector. The second goal was to
develop a roadmap to the KII under government guidance and to adopt it to the rapidly
changing environment of electronic backbone networks being built in the advanced countries.
The third, more concrete, goal was to enhance transmission capacity and geographic coverage
of the broadband network through the KII project. By improving the penetration rate of the
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high-speed Internet, the government believed that Korean society would become “a worldclass strong IT country” (MIC, 1996).
The Kim administration used the BPIP as a public relations tool for promoting the KII
project. Under President Dae-Jung Kim, IT policy was promoted by even more colorful
rhetoric about the dreams of a flourishing IT-driven Korean society. Kim, once a prominent
political activist, was focused on alleviating the economic recession that had taken hold of
Korea since the 1997 IMF crisis. The financial crisis meant that the Kim administration,
which took office in March of 1998, inherited the heavy political burden of attempting to
restructure the domestic market so as to open it to competition from global conglomerates.
While Dae-Jung Kim had advocated a democratic reform of the old authoritarian regime,
under the conditions of increasing globalization his policy shifted to the radical adoption of
neoliberal economic policies and to promoting the information and culture industries over the
labor-intensive heavy industries. Because of Kim’s success in enacting political reform,
opposition to his administration’s economic drive toward privatization and commercialization
was muted (Cho, 2000, p. 422). Kim emphasized the value-added economic effects of the
cultural industry and began to consider that the development of software and media contents
be prioritized over other strategies to nurture the national economy. In March of 1999 the
government announced a second IT policy initiative, CyberKorea 21 (CK21). Since that time,
both culture and IT have been widely regarded as key elements necessary for earning foreign
dollars and creating a new job market.
The policy goal of CK21 under the Kim administration is to create a “knowledgebased society,” improving “national competitiveness” and “the quality of life to the level of
the more advanced nations” (NCA, 2002, p. 79). CK21 highlights policy support for IT
businesses and encouraged policy goals for advanced information and communication
economies by setting forth planned guidelines for IT growth. CK21 also stressed the statedriven IT education program, the so-called Informatization Education Plan for 10 Million
Citizens, and used this slogan to create 300,000 new IT-related jobs and to increase the
digital literacy of citizens (MIC & NCA, 2005). During this period, the government sought to
encourage the demand side of the KII, striving for the creation of a critical mass of
consumers through public IT education. Impelled by Kim’s call for the rapid completion of
the KII in his New Year’s message in 2001, the MIC announced the Basic Plan for the KII
Advancement to accelerate the KII’s construction. In September of that year the government
organized the Committee for the KII Advancement, which was aimed at the market adoption
of the nationwide information infrastructure, and in April of 2002 the government announced
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its market-driven policy initiative, named “e-Korea Vision 2006” (eKV06).
The MIC’s eKV06 states that its goal is both to promote the “information society” at
the national level and to gain “strong ties of international cooperation with the global
information society” (NCA, 2003, p. 10). To do this, eKV06 declares that the government
itself must “create a smart government structure with high transparency and productivity” (egovernment) and should encourage private corporations “to strengthen global
competitiveness by promoting the informatization of all industries” (e-business) and enable
citizens “to enhance their ability to utilize information and technologies” (e-education).
Through implementing these goals, the government hopes to persuade Korean society to
become “a global leader e-Korea” (MIC & NCA, 2005, p. 100–104). Once the KII project
entered its final phase, the government’s IT policy agenda targeted three areas: bureaucratic
efficiencies through “smart government,” e-commerce through the development of media
contents, and mass digital literacy through the public and private educational institutions.
While the policy visions set forth in the e-government and e-business areas can be read as
expanded and concretized provisions of the previous market-oriented IT policies, eKV06’s
addition of e-education for citizens seems to be a distinct advance on the policies of CK21 or
the BPIP. It is notable as the first instance of the Korean government considering at a national
policy level such public issues as the “information gap” between individuals and between
regions. As is typical of the bureaucratic approach to the citizenry, the government restricted
its role to inconspicuous tasks, such as supplying computers or promoting commercial
Internet access, as well as the routinizing and rationalizing of electronic services for citizen
requests for official documents. The focus is on a quantitative approach that emphasizes
outward appearance and growth, as seen in the dramatic growth of the IT industry, rather than
on the “soft” aims of improving the cultural ability of citizens to access, use, and recreate
information without restraints. The government promoted the cultivation of digital
technology as a necessity for increasing the efficiency of government bureaucracy, to
improve national productivity, and to become an active part of the global society.
President Moo-hyun Roh, who took office in March of 2003, was even more focused
on the promotion of IT-based development of Korean society.xi In December of the same
year, his administration issued the “Broadband IT Korea Vision 2007” (BK07), which sets
forth IT as the real engine for national wealth in Korea that would finally raise the yearly
salary in Korea to $US20,000 per capita. BK07 emphasizes the geopolitical position of
Korean economy as “the electronic hub for the East Asian countries.” To accomplish this,
with the KII plan nearing its end, the government began to design the next generation of
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infrastructure plans for advancing the private sector networks. For instance, BK07 sets forth
the goal of building the total broadband multimedia networks of convergence; the details
were set forth in the “Basic Plan for the Broadband convergence Network (BcN)” and “USensor Network” (USN), issued in February of 2004; the “Distribution and Promotion Plan
of the next Internet protocol IPv6,” issued in April of 2004; and the “Master Plan for IT839
Strategies,”xii issued in July of 2005 (NIA, 2007). In BK07, the Roh administration also
emphasized that the quality of life in Korea would be improved by the rapidly increasing
opportunities arising from e-commerce with the completion of the KII-P. While Roh
succeeded in promoting the development of an Internet-based society in Korea,	
  it is apparent
that his IT initiatives have overemphasized business-oriented growth policies based on values
such as “efficiencies,” “competitiveness,” and “productivities,” to the detriment of public
welfare values such as “sustainability,” “public commons,” and “equal opportunities.”	
  
Table 1 shows the major IT policy initiatives implemented by each civilian
government. Interestingly, each president promoted a new IT-related discourse with its own
IT policy initiative, especially at the beginning of his term.

Table 1

IT Policy Initiatives under the Civilian Governments

President

Young-sam Kim
(1993–1998)

Government
rhetoric

Globalization,
dog-eat-dog competition

IT policy
initiative
Goal
Phase

Basic Plan on
Informatization
Promotion (1996–2000)
Construction of basic
electronic backbone
network
1st Phase
(1995–1997)

Dae-Jung Kim
(1998–2003)
Liberalization,
knowledge-based society
CyberKorea 21
(1999–2002)

e-Korea
Vision 2006
(2002–2006)

Creating new ITrelated job market

Upgrading the IT
infrastructure

2nd Phase (1998–
2000)

3rd Phase (2001–
2005)

Moo-hyun Roh
(2003–2008)
Global IT leader,
participatory society
Broadband IT Korea
Vision 2007
(2003–2007)
E-government,
East Asian hub of the
IT industry
BcN
(2006– present)

Source: author and NCA (2006) data

Throughout the three presidencies, the discourses are centered on Korea’s active affiliation to
the global society and the advancement of domestic IT economies. The goals centre on the
creation of a new IT job market, a large demand for broadband Internet initiated by IT
education, e-governance, and e-commerce. Through the IT policy initiatives, each
government gave the private sector — specifically, the Chaebols — its blessing, and
persuaded its citizens to be a member of a Korean-style “information society.” The state’s
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promotion of IT to its citizens boomeranged on itself by increasing the consumption expenses
per household: the rate of IT-related consumption (5.4%) per household in Korea is
burdensome, almost double that in Japan (3.1%) and triple that in the US (1.6%) (Bank of
Korea, 2005).
Further, due to the bureaucratic desire of all three presidents, who hoped to bequeath a
monumental policy inheritance to the citizens within their term, the completion year of the
KII project was repeatedly moved forward, first to 2015, then to 2010, and finally to 2005,
when it was actually completed. A principal researcher at the NIA observed,

The reason the KII project was completed by 2005 rather than by 2015 is directly
related to the presidential pledges of each administration, which aimed to accomplish
its political outcomes by “exhibitionist” policy initiatives. It is obvious that the three
phases of the KII project were greatly curtailed or condensed in response to the
inauguration of a new president. (Jeong, 5 June 2007)
In fact, the four IT initiatives over three presidencies were often used to exaggerate the real
conditions of Korean IT development, wrapping these up in exhibitionist PR. Consequently,
the rhetoric of these initiatives — such as that of surviving global competition and of
regenerating the national economy — successfully played upon the citizens’ anxieties, such
that there is now one broadband Internet per household, and allowed the state-led project to
be completed with ease and even ahead of schedule.
5.4. Lessons learned from the KII project
The present analysis confirms the facts that, in contrast to the old military regimes, the
civilian governments since 1993 have articulated various mechanisms, such as intermediary
organizations and hegemonic strategies, in order to successfully guide the state-led
infrastructure plan to completion. This paper also assesses the KII project as a prototypical IT
policy reflecting an evolving phase of the developmental state model (the “flexible” state), an
IT policy which was enacted in the midst of the shift from the “strong” state to the present
“market-driven” state. As regards the Chaebols, the KII project has created the material
conditions enabling them to become “e-Chaebols,” incumbents in new IT sector, as well as in
the traditional manufacturing sector.
Theoretically, this paper contributes to a critical reading of the developmental state
theories through disclosing the negative effects caused by the symbiosis between the state and
the Chaebols during the KII project and by relating the evolutionary phases of the state power
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to the Chaebols’ economic growth. The present paper had its origins in questioning the
popular belief among policymakers that the KII project has improved the quality of Korean
society and culture and further upgraded the country’s IT status in the global community. It is
obvious that policy rhetoric that ignores the real conditions behind the successful KII policy
plan creates a barrier to an accurate evaluation of the KII project by telecom policymakers,
politicians, and communication scholars. In fact, Korea’s developmentalism — its continuing
efforts to catch up to the economic power of the advanced nations — has been founded on
close linkages between the state and powerful corporate interests, which resulted in neglecting
the participation of the citizenry.
The underdeveloped political culture of Korea led the KII project to be a half-ripe
policy: it serves as the material foundation which has made Korea an IT powerhouse but also,
as policy, it represents the already entrenched corporate interests. The present analysis has
confirmed that the past legacies of authoritarian interventionism and developmentalism under
the military regimes still haunt such projects as the KII. Although it was planned and
implemented under civilian governments, the KII could not escape the authoritarian and
undemocratic character of the politico-social structure inherited from the military regimes.
6. Conclusion
The Korean government’s attempt to stimulate the private sector and to create new IT
demand was extremely successful over the three phases of the KII project. Nevertheless, the
process by which the KII success story was carried out raises at least one serious issue, that
of the entire exclusion of the citizens, as previously mentioned, from the decision-making
process of domestic telecom policies. In the same way, they have been excluded from the
series of multilateral and bilateral negotiations such as the WTO basic telecom agreement and
the recent US–Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations. In the 2007 FTA
negotiations with US trade representatives, for instance, the Korean government exerted
monopolistic power on the decision-making process, ignored minority voices from civil
society groups.
Ignoring the citizens in favor of the elites has been rationalized by the state logic that
nurtures Korea’s large Chaebols at the expense of her middle- and small-sized companies.
What is needed is a democratic force from below that can exert itself against such interests
and assert instead the public’s interest. It is an undeniable fact that even in today’s Korea,
“those with a connection to a few leading political figures have precedence over others who
might be better qualified” to participate in policymaking (Hyun & Lent, 1999). The backward
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political conditions in Korea — in essence, conditions of crony capitalism — combined with
the dominant trends of contemporary global capitalism make it all the more difficult, and yet
all the more necessary, to construct a democratic forum at the national policy level which is
sustained from below to work on behalf of the public welfare against the proprietary interests
of the Chaebols. Understanding the history of the KII project can provide insights into how to
formulate future telecom policies along much more socially-interventionist lines while
restraining the overwhelming power of the telecom oligopolies and Chaebols and soliciting
the input of citizens and citizens’ groups.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
Notes
i

A Chaebol in Korea means a family-owned business group with large subsidiaries occupying an oligopolistic
position, despite a relatively low concentration of ownership and the absence of pure holding companies.
ii
Whereas the earlier statists looked at the East Asian “miracle” by focusing on the disjuncture between the state
and society and the dominance of the state over society (the old developmental state model), the neo-statists
explore this economic success by focusing on the dense linkages between the state and the private sector (the
new developmental state model). Even the neo-statists, however, point to the “state-induced deliberate shifting
of the industrial structure towards higher technology, higher value-added products” (Weiss & Hobson, 1995, p.
150). In fact, despite the varying emphases on the state–industry linkages, it is clear that both the old and new
statists agree about the state’s guiding role in the East Asian economic miracle.
iii
Under Rhee’s administration, the state granted the monopoly of the “three white industries” — the processing
of cotton, flour, and sugar from the US — to the burgeoning domestic businesses that later grew to be the
family-owned Chaebols such as Samsung and Hyundai.
iv
As an example of how Korea’s political-bureaucratic elites maintained their dominant power over the interests
of big business, Johnson (1987, p. 157) describes the establishment of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency
(KCIA), which was founded as an independent political support apparatus, originally built around a 3,000-man
cadre from the existing Army Counter-Intelligence Corps, which had expanded to some 370,000 employees by
1964. The KCIA’s original mission focused on counter-communist activities and fighting military corruption.
Under the military regimes, the KCIA was used as a domestic surveillance and spying agency to collect,
analyze, and monitor intelligence data on businesses and the citizenry. The intelligence agency enabled the
development of an extreme disciplinary society which controlled not only any citizen critical of the government
but also overall business activities.
v
In the aftermath of 1997, a discourse about oeja yuchi (“the enticement of foreign capital”) has dominated
Korean society as it seeks to recover from the recession (Lim & Jang, 2006). This discourse was used to
legitimize the full-fledged opening of the domestic market to foreign investors.
vi
Since the 1997 financial crisis, the concentration of power in the hands of the larger Chaebols was accelerated
by such events as the collapse of the Daewoo Group, the divestiture of the Hyundai Group, the change of the LG
Group into a holding company, and foreign investors’ takeover attempt of SK and KT&G (Lee, 2006).
vii
In the financial crisis of 1997, when the IMF forced the Korean market to follow its structural adjustment
program, many Korean mega-conglomerates collapsed in the re-structuring of the domestic economy that
ensued, but Samsung seized its opportunity and jumped into first place in the domestic market. The different
divisions of Samsung are now a set of huge monopolies, and the corporation as a whole ranks as number one
among Korea’s ruling conglomerates, accounting for one-fifth of the country’s exports. Samsung Corporation
encompasses almost every profitable industry under its business logo: Samsung Electronics, Samsung SDI, and
Renault Samsung Motors, as well as Samsung Securities, Life Insurance, Credit Card, Heavy Industries,
Engineering, Everland Theme Park, Advertising, Petrochemicals, Shopping, Cable Channels, and so forth.
Samsung’s rapid capital accumulation has been made possible by its omnipresent power in the Korean economy
and society — described by such common terms as “Samsung’s way” or “the Republic of Samsung” — and by
its collaboration with the state in controlling the labor market. While Samsung contributed significantly to
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promoting Korea’s national economy in the global market, its dominant market power, with a total of 62
subsidiaries and a sales record of $US1.39 trillion (as of April 2005), makes it a pervasive and overwhelming
force in both the Korean economy and Korean society.
viii
In addition to jeongkyong yuchak, under Park’s junta, the term gwanchi gyeongjae, or “state-controlled
economy,” was a commonly used to denounce the military elites’ intervention in the market.
ix
The external pressures include the Korea–US bilateral negotiations, the trade sanctions imposed by the US
Trade Representative (USTR), and the WTO regulatory system.
x
Under the “cyber-building certificate system,” the government set standards on domestic and business
premises with three levels according to their capacity to handle high-speed Internet traffic capacity, and granted
the certificates to qualified buildings. This certification gave builders a motivation to enhance the broadband
access platform of apartments and buildings. (Yun, Lee & Lim, September 2002; Lee & Chan-Olmsted, 2004).
xi
President Roh has been described as “the world’s first president to be elected with the broad support of the
online generation” (Watts, 24 February 2003, p. 16). His image at the time of his inauguration was one of being
technically flexible and open to the Internet. Midway in his term of office, Roh held an unprecedented “Internet
conversation with the nation” on 23 March, 2006, which had the largest audience in the history of online
broadcasting in Korea. Moreover, the president himself uploaded five letters per a month onto the presidential
website, named the Office of the President Briefing, in order to promote direct communication with the nation
without the intervention of the press. His nickname “the night-owl president” is derived from his staying at the
keyboard until late at night for decision-making and electronic approval of e-documents through the electronic
record management system that he himself invented (Lee & Lee, 2009, in press).
xii
IT “839” was dubbed from three pillars (services, infrastructure, new growth engines): eight telecom services
(Wi-Bro, DMB, home networking, telematics, RFID, W-CDMA, Terrestrial D-TV, and Internet telephony);
three infrastructures (broadband convergence network, U-sensor network, and IPv6); and nine new growth
engines (mobile telephony, digital televisions and broadcast devices, home network equipment, system-on-chip
products, next-generation personal computer, embedded software, digital content and solutions, vehicle-based
information equipment, and intelligent robot products) (Shin, 2007).
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